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Abstract. Sharing research data from public funding is an important topic, especially now, during times of global emergencies like the 
COVID-19 pandemic, when we need policies that enable rapid sharing of research data. Our aim is to discuss and review the revised Draft 
of the OECD Recommendation Concerning Access to Research Data from Public Funding. The Recommendation is based on ethical scien-
tif ic practice, but in order to be able to apply it in real settings, we suggest several enhancements to make it more actionable. In particular, 
constant maintenance of provided software stipulated by the Recommendation is virtually impossible even for commercial software. Other 
major concerns are insufficient clarity regarding how to f inance data repositories in joint private-public investments, inconsistencies between 
data security and user-friendliness of access, little focus on the reproducibility of submitted data, risks related to the mining of large data 
sets, and sensitive (particularly personal) data protection. In addition, we identify several risks and threats that need to be considered when 
designing and developing data platforms to implement the Recommendation (e.g., not only the descriptions of the data formats but also the 
data collection methods should be available). Furthermore, the non-even level of readiness of some countries for the practical implementation 
of the proposed Recommendation poses a risk of its delayed or incomplete implementation.
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2. Overview of the Recommendation
The Recommendation consists of a preface and seven sections2. 
The earlier recommendation (from 2006) that is aimed to be 
replaced covers broadly the same topics. However, the origi-
nal document was more focused on general principles, whereas 
the new version of the Recommendation concentrates more on 
the need for national and international infrastructure systems 
to store and to re-use the data. In this section, we present an 
overview of the new Recommendation sent for consultation.
The preface refers to existing OECD recommendations and 
guidelines closely related to the discussed Recommendation, the 
wider context (e.g., the rapid growth of data produced by and 
used in scientific research and innovation), as well as the defi-
nition of basic terms used, e.g., research data and research-rel-
evant digital objects from public funding, algorithms, code, 
software and workflows used to generate research results.
Section 1 (Data governance for trust) describes rules related 
to organizing data access—the goal is to make the data available 
to as wide an audience as possible (for both individuals and 
organizations, including international data sharing), except for 
sensitive data, which, according to the Recommendation, should 
be provided on a need-to-know basis. The Recommendation 
also acknowledges the need for data anonymization and limiting 
consent to specific usages.
Section 2 (Technical standards and practices) describes some 
of the technical aspects that Adherents (states) should follow 
2 One section in the reviewed draft is not numbered, probably by mistake.
1. Introduction
We present and review the the revised Draft of the OECD 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) 
Recommendation Concerning Access to Research Data from 
Public Funding (referred to further as the Recommendation) 
aiming to replace the recommendation adopted by the 
OECD Council on 14 December 2006 [1]. The reviewed 
Recommendation document (dated June 25, 2020) was prepared 
by the OECD՚s Committee for Scientific and Technological 
Policy (CSTP) and sent for consultation to the Polish Academy 
of Sciences via the Ministry of Science and Higher Education in 
Poland1. The Recommendation provides a framework for shar-
ing research data from public funding. It is an important topic 
in general, but even more now, during times of global emer-
gencies, e.g., the COVID-19 pandemic, when we need policies 
that enable the sharing of research data to accelerate research 
in the fight against the disease. Thus, we present the overview 
of the most recent draft Recommendation sent for consultation 
in Section 2, review the Recommendation in Section 3, and for-
mulate conclusions in Section 4.
1  Someone interested in the Recommendation may contact Krzysztof  Przemie-
niecki (e-mail: Krzysztof.Przemieniecki@mnisw.gov.pl) from the Ministry of 
Science and Higher Education in Poland who coordinates the consultation 
process.
*e-mail: lech.madeyski@pwr.edu.pl
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managing publicly-funded data. The aspects mentioned in this 
section are focused mainly on making the data findable and dura-
ble—mentioned techniques include availability under immutable 
links such as Digital Object Identifiers (DOIs), consistency with 
domain conventions and metadata availability. This section also 
recommends providing non-data digital objects (such as code, 
algorithms or workflows) as a free and open source.
Section 3 (Responsibility and ownership) is a call for pro-
moting good practices, data re-use and open licensing. It also 
recommends promoting access to research data resulting from 
public-private partnerships in ways ensuring that data collected 
with public funds is as open as possible.
Section 4 (Incentives and rewards) recommends that pro-
viding data should be properly recognized and rewarded. The 
document discusses this in a little more detail, pointing out that 
recognition requires developing data assessment criteria and 
indicators of impact, as well as contributor taxonomies. It also 
emphasizes promoting data and software citation in academic 
practice, as well as taking it into account while developing cri-
teria for researcher recruitment, advancement, and grant review.
Section 5 (Sustainable infrastructures) describes some 
of the actions expected from Adherents, such as developing 
infrastructures, including data and software repositories and 
services, ensuring data prioritization, safeguarding and co-op-
erating with the private sector for the public interest.
The unnumbered section entitled Human capital discusses 
basic needs in the area of training programs and providing 
career paths for data experts necessary for data-driven research, 
as well as basic literacy skills for the general population.
The final section (International co-operation for access to 
research data) recommends setting up international fora and 
including international initiatives as part of national strategy. 
In particular, it mentions developing internationally compatible 
procedures for assessing the sensitivity of data, allowing access 
to, and establishing secure remote access to such data.
3. Review of the Recommendation
In this section, we first discuss the infeasible guideline, as well 
as the proposed enhancement to the Recommendation to make it 
more actionable. Then we present ancillary risks and threats in 
terms of practical implementation issues, the risk of unintended 
consequences, as well as expected risks.
3.1. Issue and fix related to regular maintenance of software 
design. Section 1.1.III.1.b of the Recommendation urges the 
following:
“Adherents should:
1. Foster and support open access by default to research 
data and other research-relevant digital objects from 
public funding, for both individuals and organizations, 
that, to the greatest extent possible, is:
…
b. supported by regular maintenance to prevent obsoles-
cence of data format and software design;”.
When phrased that way, one can read it as “every software 
component created from public funding should be maintained 
and its design should be updated as long as the component 
is relevant”. While this would be an ideal situation, in prac-
tice it is simply not possible—software design decays [2], 
and even commercial products face the situation when their 
design becomes obsolete. Commercial products have, gener-
ally speaking, much more stable funding, so if maintaining 
software design in these is rare, it is unrealistic to expect such 
maintenance from a publicly funded project. The Recommenda-
tion seems to acknowledge this fact by adding “to the greatest 
extent possible”.
In fact, the case is even worse—software nowadays rarely 
exists as a self-contained package, and often relies on external 
services (APIs) to complete its tasks. Since these services are 
managed by third parties, they cannot be a part of the archived 
package (as they are not created from public funding, but usu-
ally are commercial offerings). Most API providers have poli-
cies for versioning their interfaces, deprecating and removing 
functionalities. While these policies are generally not an issue 
for a maintained software product (as providers keep old ver-
sions running for at least a few months), they will definitely be 
an issue for an archived project in a few years (not to mention 
that used providers may be out of business by that time).
We are slightly concerned that a literal understanding of this 
section may be a disincentive to create and submit algorithms 
and code due to high maintenance effort. On the other hand, 
without literal understanding this part of the Recommendation 
is likely to be entirely ignored.
Possible fix would be to rephrase the sentence into “b. sup-
ported by regular maintenance to preserve data format read-
ability and keep the software executable”. While problems with 
APIs are inevitable, this at least would not hint at an obligation 
to follow recent design trends. It is likely that Adherents should 
be allowed to define various “Maintenance levels” so that most 
effort would be put into maintaining the most valuable data, 
code, designs and algorithms (as hinted is Section 1.5.VII of 
the Recommendation).
3.2. Issue related to reproducibility. Sections 1.1.III (Data 
governance for trust) and 1.2.IV (Technical standards and prac-
tices) of the Recommendation mention multiple principles that 
should be supported: timeliness, findability, user-friendliness, 
accessibility, interoperability, reusability, openness. What those 
sections omit, is reproducibility—it is briefly mentioned in the 
preface, but we believe it should receive more attention. Irre-
producibility—which may either be planned or accidental—is 
a serious problem in many fields of science like medicine [3], 
biomedical studies [4], and software engineering [5] and, in 
our opinion, should definitely be included as a principle to 
be followed. On a practical level, this would include detailed 
research protocols, data collection methods and datasheets or 
even automated scripts ran to gather data [6]. Only by including 
all relevant details we can verify research claims and avoid 
problems like comparing results obtained from two data sets 
that were sampled from different populations—a problem espe-
cially visible during COVID-19 pandemic, where infection 
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data from various countries is incomparable (and sometimes is 
incomparable even within a country, when testing rules change).
In the subsequent section, we discuss risks and threats 
that can be seen as ancillary, but we think they are also worth 
addressing (to the greatest extent possible) in the reviewed Rec-
ommendation, as well as its future revisions.
3.3. Ancillary risks and threats. Our goal is to examine ancil-
lary problems and risks of three types: practical implementation 
issues, unintended consequences and expected risks.
3.3.1. Practical implementation issues. We have identified 
two practical implementation issues:
1. Funding for infrastructure development and maintenance. 
The only issue directly mentioned in the Recommendation 
that might be considered controversial is the guideline to en-
courage private investment in research data infrastructures 
which some researchers may consider poses a threat to the 
independence of university research. Large scale research 
databases are a valuable resource which is likely to increase 
in value over time. Selling access to national resources to 
commercial organizations, perhaps with links to other coun-
tries, in return for providing infrastructure systems would 
require very careful negotiations with potential suppliers 
to ensure that the public benefits from the data, not just 
the infrastructure supplier. We believe that the resources of 
government-funded organizations are often far more lim-
ited than the resources available to private organizations 
when it comes to licensing, intellectual property and data 
ownership issues. The current discussion concerning med-
ical data [7‒10] might be a useful test case for identifying 
the risks and problems associated with funding database 
infrastructure and data maintenance. The critical issue is 
to balance the need for funding to support the infrastruc-
ture and the maintenance process required to implement the 
Recommendation, with its goal to gain additional benefit to 
the public from the outcomes of publicly-funded research.
2. Requirements for timely, findable, user-friendly, preferably 
Internet-based data storage facilities are in conflict with re-
quirements for secure, access-controlled data. Meeting con-
flicting requirements is difficult and costly, and therefore 
adds more complexity to the basic infrastructure funding 
issue. It is critical that all non-functional requirements are 
fully specified and the decisions with respect to trade-offs 
have been discussed and agreed upon among the relevant 
stakeholders prior to awarding any contracts for software 
platform design and development.
3.3.2. The risk of unintended consequences. In the social sci-
ences, unintended consequences (also referred to as unantici-
pated consequences or unforeseen consequences) are outcomes 
of a purposeful action that are not intended or foreseen. They 
can be grouped into three types:
1. Unexpected benefit: a positive unexpected benefit (also re-
ferred to as luck, serendipity or a windfall).
2. Unexpected drawback: an unexpected detriment occurring 
in addition to the desired effect of the policy.
3. Perverse result: a perverse effect contrary to what was orig-
inally intended (when an intended solution makes a problem 
worse).
In the context of open access, the rise of the predatory pub-
lishing industry might be considered an unexpected drawback. 
Drawing researchers from countries with few libraries and lit-
tle access to high quality research into reliance on predatory 
publishing literature might be considered a perverse result. The 
increase in the numbers of high impact open access journals 
focused solely on open source software and algorithms (e.g., 
Journal of Statistical Software) might be considered an unex-
pected benefit of the rising popularity of open access journals.
It is hard to believe that there will be no unintended conse-
quences of establishing national databases of publicly funded 
research data or that all unintended consequences will be pos-
itive.
3.3.3. Expected risks. Ideally we would like to be able to iden-
tify the novel risks and problems that might arise from the 
OECD Recommendation, but it might be useful to consider 
risks extrapolated from initial trends as a starting position for 
risk analysis.
1. Clearly, we can expect any database of potentially valu-
able research data to be a magnet for hacking attempts. This 
might be “just for fun” attacks from individual hackers, but 
could also involve industrial espionage sponsored by organi-
zations or states who want to avoid paying licensing fees or 
obeying access restrictions. We should also be prepared for 
attempts to corrupt or destroy valuable data to undermine 
the work of legitimate research groups. This risk emphasizes 
the need for well-defined security requirements.
2. While the Recommendation acknowledges the need for 
seeking consent in the case of using personal data for new 
purposes, such action is extremely hard to enforce in prac-
tice, especially while maintaining as wide access to data as 
possible. After the introduction of GDPR and other data 
protection acts the concept of sensitive data is understood 
much better. However, the protection given by them to an 
individual may still be insufficient. As of now, proper risk 
assessment still requires experts in sensitive data handling 
for compliance. It is likely that Adherents will need to set up 
special repositories for sensitive data and data stewardship 
organizations to avoid abuse.
3. We second the idea of providing as many publicly funded 
digital objects as open source as possible (in fact, we de-
velop the reproducer R package that includes open data 
sets from a range of empirical studies in software engineer-
ing, e.g., [11]). However, we would like to point out that 
“Open Source” is not exactly a well-defined term. There are 
at least several definitions (to name a few defining parties: 
Free Software Foundation, Open Source Initiative, Open 
Knowledge International), which are not fully compatible. 
This is a potential pitfall for Adherents that must be consid-
ered carefully, as the range of licenses acceptable as “Open 
Source” varies depending on chosen definition.
4. Organizations might try advanced data mining techniques to 
overcome anonymity and use the data in combination with 
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other data sources for potentially criminal purposes. The 
Cambridge Analytica scandal is a case in point. Cambridge 
Analytica Ltd (CA) was a British political consulting firm 
that combined misappropriation of digital assets, data min-
ing, data brokerage, and data analysis with strategic commu-
nication during electoral processes. In 2016, CA worked for 
Donald Trump’s presidential campaign as well as for Leave.
EU (one of the organizations campaigning in the United 
Kingdom’s referendum on European Union membership). 
CA’s role in those campaigns is the subject of ongoing crim-
inal investigations in both countries. This emphasizes the 
need for more well-defined, appropriate and audited access 
control to stored data.
5. There is a risk related to data mining using Artif icial In-
telligence (AI)/Machine Learning (ML) techniques. They 
use very large data sets to look for patterns among large 
numbers of variables but they can overfit, they can ref lect 
the prejudices of their builders, and they assume that an 
ultra large data set has equivalent properties to a random 
data set. So we can expect more data mining studies based 
on analysis of public data sets, some providing extremely 
valuable scientific outcomes, but we can also expect a num-
ber of f lawed and invalid analyses [12‒14]. We fully rec-
ognise the value of data mining and machine learning, but 
we also believe that our scientif ic research and commercial 
exploitation must agree with the maxim “f irst, must do no 
harm”.
6. The Recommendation includes incentives and rewards for 
data scientists which would encourage the production of 
meta-analytic studies. Unfortunately, this implies that re-
search publishers can expect to be swamped with poor qual-
ity meta-analyses. In 2016, Ioannidis [15] identified that 
there is massive production of unnecessary, misleading, 
and contradictory systematic reviews and meta-analyses. 
He pointed out that instead of promoting evidence-based 
medicine and health care, they are either an easy way of 
increasing publication counts or marketing tools. He also 
pointed out that poor quality secondary studies are harmful 
“given the major prestige and influence these types of stud-
ies have acquired”. He suggests that systematic reviews and 
meta-analyses studies need to better avoid biases and vested 
interests and to be better integrated with primary studies.
7. Another implication of the incentives and rewards is that 
we can expect to see more fake data (for an example of the 
prevalence of fake data see [16]). There are various tech-
niques to detect fake data. Assuming the data set is avail-
able, one can use a range of strategies to figure out whether 
the numbers seem “ fabricated” by the researcher. For exam-
ple, it is known that humans have a preference for numbers 
ending in round values. Thus a χ-squared test can be used 
to see if these round numbers are too prevalent in the data 
set. There are also available statistical tools to detect data 
fabrication [17, 18]. Furthermore, one may use summary 
statistics to check for potential fraud or error, e.g., Brown 
and Heather՚s GRIM (Granularity-Related Inconsistency of 
Means) test [19] that can detect problems when the summa-
ry statistics have been fabricated, as well as related soft-
ware tools, e.g., “Sprite” (Sample Parameter Reconstruction 
via Iterative Techniques) [20] (see also https://hackernoon.
com/introducing-sprite-and-the-case-of-the-carthorse-child-
58683c2bfeb). There are also known statistical methods for 
the detection of data fabrication in clinical trials (e.g., [21]). 
However, the database itself would be a source of real data 
sets that might be used to improve the construction and 
plausibility of fake data sets. Continual improvement of 
procedures to detect fake data integrated with appropriate 
auditing of submitted data are essential to protect the integ-
rity of a repository of scientific data.
4. Conclusions
In this paper, we discuss and review the revised Draft of the 
OECD Recommendation Concerning Access to Research Data 
from Public Funding. In our opinion, the scientific principles 
embodied in the Recommendation are excellent and should be 
supported. However, as we point out in Section 3.1, the Rec-
ommendation must conform with the reality of software design 
and maintenance, which is clearly not the case, thus we have 
formulated a more actionable statement of the maintenance 
requirement.
As an extension to the Recommendation, in Section 3.2, 
we propose to include reproducibility as one of principles that 
should be considered when building data sets and supporting 
infrastructure with particular focus on data collection and sam-
pling procedures.
Furthermore, the Recommendation seems to assume that all 
individual researchers, research groups, industry and nations are 
prepared to work together for the general public good. How-
ever, as discussed in Section 3.3, a world-wide repository of 
research data (even if it is distributed among different Adher-
ents) is a potentially valuable target for both unethical and 
criminal behavior at the individual, organizational and national 
level. In particular, individual guidelines aimed at ensuring data 
can be easily reused are at odds with the need to prevent data 
from being corrupted or misused. To address the issues raised 
in Section 3.3, we suggest that OECD add the following two 
elements to Section 1.2 (Technical standards and practices) of 
the Recommendation:
1. Put in place on-going risk management processes to iden-
tify, manage and monitor risks associated with maintaining 
the integrity and security of data.
2. Establish procedures to audit the quality of studies based 
on reusing the data.
We also note that monitoring the use of data repositories will 
allow Adherents to publicise the benefits delivered from the 
reuse of publicly-funded data.
In addition, we suggest that that OECD add the following 
element to Section 1.1 (Data governance for trust) of the Rec-
ommendation: Cooperate with the community to create rules 
and processes for retiring data and other digital objects devel-
oped under publicly-funded projects, which would take into 
account its relevance, integrity, requirement maintenance effort 
and other metrics.
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In conclusion, we believe that the Recommendation should 
be supported, but to apply it in real settings, we suggest the 
Recommendation be refined to address the issues we raise in 
Section 3.
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